in the literature or in current statistical practice.
2. Inferences and decision~For the present discussion a statistical inference will be defined as a statement about statistical populations made from given observations with measured uncertainty. An inference in general is an uncertain conclusion. Two things mark out statistical inferences. First the information on which they are based is statistical, i.e. consists of observations subject to random fluctuations. Secondly we explicitly recognize that our conclusion is uncertain and attempt to measure, as objectively as possible, the uncertainty involved.
A statistical inference carries us from observations to conclusions about the populations sampled. A scientific infereme in the broader sense is usually concerned with arguing from essentially descriptive facts about populations to some deeper understanding of the process under investigation. The more the statistical inference helps us wi. th this latter process the better.
Statistical inferences involve the data, assumptions about the populations sampled, a question about the populations, and very occasionally a distribution ot prior probability. No consideration of losses is usually involved directly in the inference although these may affect the question asked.
Statistical decisions deal with the best action to take on the basis ot statistical information. Decisions are based on not only the considerations just *Invited address given at a joint meeting of the Institute of Mathematical Statistics and the Biometric Sociev, Princeton Univ~sity, Princeton, N•.J., April 20, 1956. part of the way?
First, particularly in scientific problems, it seans of intrinsic interest to be able to say what the data tell us, quite apart from the course of action that we decide upon. Secondly, even in problems where a clear-cut decision is the sole object, it often happens that the assessment of losses and prior information is highly subjective, and therefore it may be advantageous to get clear the relatively objective matter of what the data say, before embarking on the more controversial issues.
A full discussion of this distinction between inferences and decisions will not be attempted here. Two further points are, however, worth making briefiy.
First, some people have suggested that what is here called 'inference' should be considered as t summarization of data'. This choice of words seems not to recognize that we are essentially concerned with the uncertainty involved in passing from the observations to the underlying populations. Secondly, the distinction drawn here is between the applied problem of inference and the applied problem of decision-making; it is possible that a satisfactory set of techniques for inference could be constructed from the mathematical structure used in decision theory.
3. The sample space. Statistical methods work by referring the observations S to a sample space L of observations that might have been obtained. Over L one or more probability' measures are defined and calculations in these probability distributions give our significance limits" confidence intervals, etc. 2.is usually taken to be the set of all possible samples having the same size and structure as the observations. R. A. Fisher (see, for example, ;' 7.: ) and G. A. Barnard, t" 2; , have pointed out that L. may have no direct counterpart in indefinite repetition of the experiment. For example if the experiment were repeated" it may be that the sample size would change. Therefore what happens 'Mien the experiment is repeated is not sufficient to determine L , and the correct choice of L may need careful consideration.
As a comment on this point, it may be helpful to see an example where the sample size is fixed, where a definite space L is determined by repetition of the experiment and yet where probability calculations over 2.. do not seem relevant to statistical inference.
Suppose that we are interested in the mean e of a normal population and that, by an objective randomization device, we draw either (i) with probability instance which population has been sampled.
More realistic examples can be given, for instance in terms of regression problems in which the frequency distribution of the independent variable is koown.
However the present example illustrates the point at issue in the simplest terms.
(A similar example has been discussed trom a rather different point of view in '!he sample space tormed by indefinite repetition of the experiment is clearly defined and consists of two real lines L. , I each having probability 1/2 1ã nd conditionally on I. there is a normal distribution of meaD e and variance l. (ii) the values of a,s give no information about 9 in that their joint "'t4fd istribution function I:,)~~j~J) is such that for any a, s,~, l'~, there exis ts (J.' such that
then inference about Q should be based on the distribution of t given a,
i.e. the sample space r should consider a as fixed and equal to its observed .ṽ alue.
To apply this defin:1.ti.on we hays to !'ega::.'d our cbservations as generated by a random process; the d..;l:·~.r:.:.t.ion simply talls us how to cut down the sample apace to those point relev~nt to the interpretation of the observations we have.
The equation * is the formal expression of the condition that a (and a) give .". 'V\ no basis for discrimination between different values of~e .~~\, For example let r 1 , r 2 be randomly drawn from Poisson distributions of means ,h, J /~l. and let /;. /./~= (Si be the parameter of interest; that is write the means as ¢ , ¢~where ¢ is a nuisance parameter. The likelihood of r I , r 2 can be written
where t =r l , a =~l + r 2 " The equation * is easily shmvn to~e satisfied, telling us that a gives us no information about ry < Therefore significance and confidence oalculations are to be made condi. tionally on the observed value of a, as is the conventional procedure [12 J . Note tha t if the populations for atudy were selected by a random procedure independent of':( , the likelihood would be changed only by a factor independent, of f::} and the final choice of sample space would be unchangedo A method of inference that used only the values of likelihood ratio 'WOuld avoid these difficulties Anotr...eJ:' impor-tant prob:.'3'1l comv~cted wj.th the choice of the eample space concerns the possibilit,y and desirabili ty of making inferences within finite sarrple speces obtain.ed b~r permuti!lg the observat.ions d~.scuss~d here.
• This matter will not be - Yet this seems to a large extent a matter of presentation,; there seems no reason why we should not work with confidence distributions for the unknown parameter. These can either be defined directly, or can be introduced in terms of the set of all confidence intervals at different levels of probability. Statements made on the basis of this distribution, provided we are careful about their fom, have a direct frequency interpretation. In ap~lications it will otten be enough to specify the confidence distribution, by for example a pair of intervals, and this corresponds to the CODman practice of quoting say both the 95 per cent and the 99 per cent confidence intervals.
If we consider that the object of interval estimation is to give a rule for making on the basis of each set of data, a statement about the unkmwn parameter, a certain proportion of the statements to be correct in the long run, consideration of the confidence distribution may seem urmecessary and possibly invalid. The attitude taken here is that the object is to attach, on the basis of data S, a measure of uncertainty to different possible values of B , soowing what can be inferred about G trom the data. The frequency interpretation of the confidenoe intervals is the way by which the measure of uncertainty is given a concrete interpretation, rather than the direct object of the inference. It is then difficult to see an objection to the consideration of many confidence statements simultaneously.
for 6)~(), a continuous dis tribution __'.:
,Ii). ,7)
As an example, ccnsider the estimatim of the mean t9 ci a normal population of unit variance, from a single observation x, when it is given that
The frequency interpretation of this is that if we were to select always the set of 19 values covered by some fixed part of the confidence distribution, e.g. the lower 95 per cent, then for any ();'7 U , the true value is covered in 95 per cent of trials in the long run. For~=0 , the corresponding frequency exceeds 95 p:lr cent, or can be made equal to 95 per cent by a natural process of random selection. Such a random process to achieve exactly 95 per cent coverage is a process to eXplain the concrete meaning of the confidence distribution; it does not seem relevant to the actual use of the distribution in applica tions.
If the restriction is that <Y 7 C there is a difficul:'y in that t9 ': 0 is an inadmissable parameter value and it is not sensible to attach confidence probability to a parameter value that cannot occur. This seems, however, a rather artifical matter and it seems reasonable to deal with it by the convention that 0 = (' \ is to stand for some very small positiva value of~.
(ii) It is sometimes claimed as an advantage of fiducial estimation that it is restricted to methods that use 'all the infonnation in the data,' while confidence estimation includes any method giving the requisite frequency interpretation. 'Ibis claim is lent sane support by those accounts of confidence interval theory lIhich use the lIOrds 'valid' or 'exact' tor a method of calculating intervals that has, under a given mathematical set-up, an exact frequency interpretation, no matter how inadequate the intervals may be in telling us what can be learnt from the data.
However, good accounts of the theory of confidence intervals stress equally the need to cover the true value wi th the required probability and the requirement of having the intervals as narrow as possible. Very special importance, therefore, attaches to intervals based on exhaustive estimates. It is true that there are differencesbetween the approaches in that the fiducial method takes the use of exhaustive estimates as a primary requirement, mereas in the theory of confidence intervals the use of exhaustive estimates is deduced from some other condition. There does not seem a major difference between the methods here. The present posi tion is tha t several cases are known where the fiducial method ads to non-unique answers and, so far as I know, none where the confidence intervals, based on exhaustive estimates, are not unique. It is, of course, entirely po ssible that a way will be found of formula ting fiducial calculations to make them unique. But it is clear that at present there is no ground for preferring the fiducial approach on these considerations.
(iv) If exhaustive estimation is possible for a group of plrameters, fiducial inference will usually be possible about art9' one of them or any combination of them, since the joint fiducial distribution of all the parameters can be found and the unwanted parametem integrated out. Exact confidence estimation is in general possible only for restricted canbinations of parameters. An example is the Behrens-Fisher problem, where exact fiducial inference is possible. The 81tuation about confidence estimation in th1s case is not too clear but is probably that the procedure preferred by Welch, while giving a close approximatim to an 'exact' sys tem of confidence intervals, has f'requenCY-ptOperties depending slightly on the nuisance parameters.
This point is, the possibility that no exact confidence interval solution to the problem exists was recognized by Welch: see also li.4]. Somewhat academic is that these consideratiors are all with respect to those idealized conditions in which sufficient statistics exist, however, within this framework the fiducial technique is certainly the more powerful.
(v) The final consideration concerns the question of frequency verification. R. A. Fisher has repeatedly stated that the object of fiducial inference is not to make statements that will be correct nth given frequency in the long run. One may agree with this in that one really wants to measure . the uncertainty corresponding to different ranges of values far e , and it is qui te conceivable that one could construct a satisfactory measure of uncer-Uiinty that has not a frequency interpretaticn. Yet one must surely insist on some pret1:l{ clear-cut practical meaning to the measure of uncertainty and this fiducial probability has never been shown to have. J. T. Tukey's recent work on fiducial probability and its frequency verification should be referred to here.
It seems, therefore, that with some shifts of emphasis, the theory ot confidence intervals is adequate to deal with the problem of the interval estimation. Two aspects of significance tests will be discussed briefly here.
*
First there is the question of when significance tests are useful and secondly there 1s the justi.fication of (**) as a measure of conformity.
'lbe discussion is restricted to the testing of simple hypotheses about unknown parameters, with or without nuisance parameters. For example, if e is the mean of a normal populatim, we consider tests of 13> = 0 , but not of e L:.. 0 • Perhaps the most frequent type of application of significance tests, at any rate in technological work, is in situations where the null hypothesis is almos t certainly false and where, moreover, we have no particular reason to think that it is even approximately true. For example, in the comparison of two alternative industrial processes we would usually be certain that an experiment of sufficient sensitivity would show there to be some real difference between the processes in whatever property is of interest. The significance test is concerned wi th whether we can, from the data under analysis, claim the existence of a difference.
Or, to look at the matter slightJ.y differently, the significance level tells us at what ]e vels the confidence intervals for the true difference include only values with the same sign as the sample difference. This idea that the significance level is concerned with the possibility that the true effect may be in the opposite directi.on from that observed, occurs in a different way in~].
Hardly ever is the answer to the significance tes t the only thing we should consider: whether or not significance is attained at an interesting level (say at least at the 10% level), some considerati.on shculd * F. J. Anscombe [1] has recently given a very interesting discussion of this. be given to whether differences ihat may exist are of pratical importance,
i.e. estimation should be considered as well as significance testing. A possible exception to this is in the analysis of very limited amounts of data. Here it can often be taken for granted tha.t differ:"lnces of p!'atica1 importance are consistant with the data, the point of the statistical analysis being to see whether the direction of any effects has been reasonably well established.
The problem dealt with by a significance test, P.S jv.st cO~lside:r'ed, is different from that of deciding which of two treatments is to be recommended for future use.. This carmot be taclded 'Without careful consideration of the differences of practical importance, the losses consequent on wrong decisions and the prior knowledge.
Another type of application of significance tests is to situations where there is a definite possibility that the null hypothesis is very nearly true. (Exact truth of a null hypothesis is unlikely except in a genuine uniformity trial.) A full analysis of such a situation would involve consideration of what departure from the null hypothesis is considered of Jr8ctical importance. However, it is often convenient to test the null hypothesis directly; i£ significant departure trom it is obtained, consideration must then be given to whether the departure is of practical importance. Of course, we probably in any case will wish to examine the problem as one of estimation as well 8S of significance testing.
Consider now the choice of (**) as the quantity to measure significance. To use the definition, we need to order the points of the sample space in terms of the evidence they provide against the null hypothesis.
There are t1D ways of doing this. The first, and most satisfactory, is -lSthe introduction, as in the usual development of the Neyman-Pearson theory, ot the requirement of maximum sensitivity in the detection of certain types of departure from the null hypothesis. That is, we wish, in the simpliest case, to maximize, if possible for all fixed <9; 1...1 probe (attaining significance at the t. level),
where 9 represents a set-up which we derive to distinguish from the null hypothesis. This leads, in simple cases, to a unique specification of the significance probability (**).
A second method of ordering the sample points to determine (**) i which leads to a unique answer for discrete distributions, involves the null hypothesis itself am uses no appeal to the notion of al ternative b;ypothesea. We say that sample point 8 1 shows as much or more evidence and hence calculate (**) by summing over all points wi th probability, under the null hypotheses, less than or equal to that of the observed point. We may call this a test of pure consistency with the null hypothesis as opposed to the preVious type, which we may call a test of specific discrimination.
It is clear that 1£ we are in a poSition to specify what type of alternative we wish to detect, it 'Will be much better to use the first type of test.
In some standard cases, the two methods give identical answers.
The next question to consider is why we sum over a whole set of sample points rather than 11:> rk in terms only of the observed point. This has been discussed. The advantage of (**) is that it has a clear-cut physical interpretation in terms of the formal scheme of acceptance and rejection contem- sel-ves agains t the pos sibil1ty that the' effect' is in the direc tion opposite to that observed, the use of the tail area seems more reasonable.
As noted in i} the use of likelihood ratios ra ther than summed probabi- shown to be highly significant by the usual F tes":. ar,d a rot~gh cC:l.]cuJ.at,~.an made to show that provi ded tha t 11either Rexceeded the 1 per cent level would still occur.
The choice between methods (i) and (ii) depends on (a) the extend to which our prior knowledge limits the population from;
(b) the amount of information in the data about the population characteristic that may be used as a nuisance parameter;
(c) the extent to which the final conclusion is sensitive to the particular population characteristic of interest.
Thus, in (a), if we have a good idea of the population form, we are probably not much interested in the fact that a distribution-free method has certain de-'sirable properties for distributions quite unlike that we expect to encounter.
To comment on (b), we would probably not wish to studentize with respect to a population characteristic about which hardly any information was contained in the sample, e.g. as estimate ot variance with one or two degrees of freedom. In sample small/problems there is frequently li ttle information about population shape contained in the data. Finally there is consideration (0). If the final conelusion is very stable under changes of distribution form, it is usually convenient to take the most appropriate simple theoretical fonnas a basis for the analysis and to use method (ii). Now it is very probable that in many instances investigation would show that the same answer would, for praotical purposes, result from the alternative types of method we have been discussing. But suppose that in a particular instance there is disagreement, e.g. that the result of applying a t test were to differ materially from that of applying some distribution-free procedure. What would we do1 -20-It seems to me that, even if we have no good reason for expecting a normal population, we would not be willing to accept the distribution-free answer uncondi tionally. A serious difference between the results at the two tes ts would usually indicate that the conclusion we draw about the population mean depends on the population shape in an important way, e.g. depends on the attitude we take to certain outlying observations in the sample. I t seems more satisfactory for a full discussion of the data, to state this and to assemble whatever eVidence is available about distributional form, rather than to simply use the distributionfree a9proach. Distribution-free methods are, however, often very useful in small sample situations where little is known about population form and where elaborate discussion of the results would be out of place.
Clearly much more discussion of these problems is needed.
(1] [3J (,J [6] 
